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APOLOGY WITHIN A MORAL DIALECTIC:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROBBENNOLT
Lee Taft*
Over the last several years, much has been written about the role
of apology in facilitating the resolution of legal disputes.1 Within this
body of work a debate has developed among legal scholars,
practitioners, and legislators. Under traditional rules of evidence an
apology which acknowledged fault would enter evidence as an
admission against interest. Now there is a movement to legislatively
"protect" apologies from the effects of the traditional rule in order to
facilitate apology without evidentiary encumbrance. Scholars who
have argued in favor of the relaxation of the traditional rule have
largely relied on anecdotal evidence to support their arguments. Now,
in her recent article Apologies and Legal Settlement, Professor
Jennifer K. Robbennolt makes a long-overdue empirical contribution
to analyses of the role of apology in settlement.2 Robbennolt
concludes that fault-admitting apologies will indeed enhance the
likelihood of settlements, and that this is true regardless of whether or
not the apology is "protected." This conclusion matters not only
because it provides an empirical basis for the efficacy of fault
admitting apologies, but also because of its attraction to legislators
who like to see empirical studies before changing long-standing rules
of law like the evidentiary rule in question here.
While I appreciate Professor Robbennolt's useful insights, I also
have two sets of concerns about her suggestion that policy discussion
focus on the appropriateness of statutory protection of the full
apology. First and primarily, her empirical results - even if
interpreted by policymakers as showing the efficacy of the protected
* J. D. 1975,St. Mary's University School of Law; M. Div. 1999, Harvard Divinity School.
The author is an ethicist who provides solutions to businesses, organizations, and individuals
facing crisis in the wake of error by focusing on the ethical opportunities crisis offers. - Ed.
Mr. Taft is grateful to Professor Ellen Smith Pryor for her editorial input, intellectual
support, and encouragement, without which this essay would have remained an afternoon
monologue. He would also like to thank Peter DiCola for his insightful editorial suggestions,
and all the Editors of the Michigan Law Review for taking extra time to examine the debate
that is the subject of this essay. Mr. Taft can be contacted at leetaft@earthlink.net.

1. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009
(1999); Daniel Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000); Lee
Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000);
Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997).
2. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003).

1010

March 2005]

Apology Within a Dialectic

1011

full apology in promoting settlement - do not by themselves make an
adequate case for legislation protecting apology. Rather, those who
favor legislation protecting full apology must take into account the
moral dimension of apology, and the implications of giving this moral
dimension short shrift. As I explain, even a solid empirical case
showing a high increase in settlement due to apology would not
adequately address the moral harm of legislative protection for
apology. More than utility is at stake when a legislature tailors a moral
process to fit within a system that is primarily adversarial.
A second concern relates to Professor Robbennolt's findings. Her
findings, she suggests, show that participants, while aware of the
different evidentiary rules, "did not adjust their assessments of the
apologies received in response to those rules." 3 Thus, to the reader of
this finding, the suggestion is that, to the injured person, the efficacy of
apology is not dependent on its admissibility or whether the party
offering the apology will face consequences tied to it. Robbennolt
suggests a variety of factors that might explain this finding. I offer a
different view of this finding, a finding that is crucial to the argument
in favor of protected apology.
Robbennolt's study participants visited a website in order to read
an accident scenario.4 The participants were assigned the role of the
injured party and then asked to evaluate a settlement offer from the
other party.5 Robbennolt introduced numerous control variables into
this two-part study which enabled her to monitor how different kinds
of apologies impacted settlement, whether the protection of the
apologies was of significance to these participants, and how the
severity of the injury affected the participants' perception of the
apologies.6
Robbennolt adopted the language that has emerged in recent
scholarship to identify the different kinds of apologies she was
evaluating. A "partial apology" is one in which the offending party
expresses sympathy and hope for a rapid recovery, but does not accept
responsibility for the accident causing the injury.7 A "full apology"
includes the expression of sympathy contained in the partial apology
but, importantly, adds an acknowledgment of responsibility: "I am
sorry you were hurt. The accident was all my fault. I was going too fast
and not watching where I was going until it was too late."8
3. Id. at 491.
4. Id. at 483.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 483-92.
7. Id. at 484 n.112.
8. Id.

1012

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:1010

Robbennolt found that the "offender who offered a full apology
was seen as experiencing more regret, as more moral, and as more
likely to be careful in the future than one offering a partial or no
apology."9 Consequently, the full apology "was viewed as more
sufficient than either a partial apology or no apology."10 As a result of
these data, Robbennolt empirically established that apologies affect
injured parties' inclination to accept or reject a settlement offer.11 Yet,
ultimately, the type of apology was what positively influenced
settlement: "Only the full, responsibility-accepting apology increased
the likelihood that the offer would be accepted."12 By contrast, the
partial apology actually created ambivalence in the injured party
increasing the "participants' uncertainty about whether or not to
accept the offer."13
From a moral perspective, Robbennolt's findings make perfect
sense. When one injures another, accepting responsibility requires
moral courage. Yet, apology is not moral simply because of the
acknowledgment that one has caused injury. What elevates it to a truly
moral and corrective communication is the offending party's
willingness to accept the consequences that flow from the wrongful
act. That is, the moral dimension of apology rests on both the
acknowledgment of wrongful conduct and the willingness to accept
responsibility for the harm caused.14 It is this moral dimension that I
think led Robbennolt's subjects to find the full apology more sufficient
than the partial.15 Yet, if a willingness to accept consequences for one's
wrongful action is an essential element of a full apology, then why is it

9. Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
10. Id.

1L Id. at 491.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In his recent book, Faking It, William Ian Miller reaches a similar conclusion, but for
different moral reasons. In Miller's analysis, remorse is the easiest of our emotions to fake,
and is therefore essentially unreliable and untrustworthy. Relying largely on his expertise of
honor cultures, Miller insists that for apology to be trustworthy it must contain an element of
satisfaction, a term he borrows from a religious understanding of penance. For Miller,
satisfaction must include a marker of its sincerity through some punitive attendant, like the
pain one sibling feels when forced to apologize to his sister. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING
IT 77-9S (2003). I, too, insist that apology have some marker of its authenticity and, for me,
that marker is the willingness to accept the consequences that flow from the wrongful act,
including legal culpability. While I understand that legal consequences can be painful, I do
not see the telos of the demand in the punitive way described by Miller. Rather, I see the
willingness to accept consequences as an act of moral courage, which can inspire healing in
both the party harmed as well as in the offender. From Miller's perspective, apology is an act
of humiliation. From mine, it is one of reparation. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22;
see also Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Error: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L.
SS, 62-67 (200S).
lS. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at 487.
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that Robbennolt's subjects, while aware of the content of the different
evidentiary rules, did not adjust their assessment in response to those
rules?16
Robbennolt offers a variety of factors that might explain this
surprising result.17 Among those is the significant fact that the
participants "may have discounted the influence of the statutory
protection given the specific facts of the situation with which they
were faced."18 In Robbennolt's studies the apologies were offered
soon after the event, involved an interpersonal communication
between neighbors, and were expressed in a context in which the
"offender's responsibility was judged to be relatively clear" and where
the offer made was a fair offer.19 Her recognition of the uniqueness of
these facts prompts her to consider whether a protected apology might
be received more skeptically if the apology was offered by a stranger
or accompanied by a less reasonable offer of settlement or made late
in the game. These possibilities lead her to offer this caveat: "Clearly,
additional research is needed to explore these boundaries. "20 Yet,
rather than describe the kind of empirical work that needs to be done,
she instead concludes "that policy discussion ought to focus on the
appropriateness of statutory protection for full apologies. "21
My interest in responding to Professor RobbennoJt is both
theoretical and practical. I am a proponent of the full, unprotected
apology.22 I believe that if we do not understand apology as part of a
moral dialectic we risk subverting its moral dimension. Apology is
integral to repentance, itself a complex process that when
authentically performed can inspire forgiveness and reconciliation
between a party injured and the one causing the injury.23 Repentance
starts as feeling of remorse within the conscience of the party causing
harm and is given voice in apology. This experience is, for some, a
deeply religious process. Yet, for all, it should be an ethical and moral
response to harm inflicted.
Legal scholars often give this moral dimension short shrift,
especially when they evaluate apologies using a standard of legal

16. Id. at 500.
17. Id. at 502-05.
18. Id. at 504.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 505.
22. See Taft, supra note 1.
23. See Taft, supra note 14, at 65 (illustrating the process from harm to reconciliation).
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efficacy.24 Yet, when utility becomes the primary standard for
legislative initiatives, there is a cost to both individuals and society.
This harm rises dramatically when one extracts components of moral
processes and inserts them into utilitarian schemas.
Consider a group of children throwing snowballs at passing cars.
One snowball hits the side of a car and causes damage. The driver
stops and confronts the thrower. The child fully apologizes to the
driver: "I am sorry I hurt your car. The damage was all my fault. I
should not have been throwing snowballs." If the social contract is that
the apology may not be used as evidence of wrongdoing, what is the
driver to do if, in a conversation with the child's parents, the child
denies his part in causing harm? And what about the lesson learned by
the child? If one can apologize with impunity, how is one's moral
compass distorted? And what are the broader costs to human relations
when utility becomes the arbiter of moral processes?
This concern now confronts the citizens of Colorado because their
legislature passed a bill protecting full apologies if expressed by a
health-care provider or an employee of a health-care provider to an
alleged victim, a relative of an alleged victim, or a representative of an
alleged victim of an "unanticipated outcome of medical care."25 This
statute is narrower than that contemplated by Professor Robbennolt
because rather than providing statutory protection for all full
apologies, it protects only those of a particular group of people. Still, it
illustrates the kind of statute Robbennolt suggests policymakers ought
to consider.
Recall that Robbennolt acknowledged participants in her study
"may have discounted the influence of the statutory protection"
because the apology was tendered "in the context of an interpersonal
dispute between neighbors, where the offender's responsibility was
judged to be relatively clear, and the offer was fairly reasonable."26
She wondered whether her respondents would be more skeptical of
protected apologies "offered in conjunction with less generous

24. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1; Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a
Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
221 (1999); Shuman, supra note 1.
25. '"Unanticipated outcome' means the outcome of a medical treatment or procedure
that differs from an expected result. " COLO. REV. STAT.§ 13-25-135(2)(d) (2003). Colorado
is not the only state to have a statute protecting the apologies of health-care providers. In
Oregon, any apology or expression of regret will "not constitute an admission of liability for
any purpose" if made by a person licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners. OR. REV.
STAT. § 677.082(1) (2003). In fact, the Oregon statute is more expansive than that in
Colorado since Oregon's protection extends to any civil action, not just those arising from
the delivery of health care. Id.; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 63,§ 1-1708.lH (West Supp.
2004) (protecting full apologies in any medical liability action).
26. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at 504 (citations omitted).
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offers."27 I would add an additional query: What about those circum
stances in which settlement negotiations fail?
Robbennolt's study is important in showing how full apologies
influence settlement, yet it does not discuss what happens when
settlement fails. This is an important omission, especially when a
policy change is at stake. Using the Colorado statute, I offer another
hypothetical to illuminate the problem I intend to highlight.
Imagine that you have been injured in an automobile collision and
you are transported to a major trauma center in Denver. There you
undergo a surgical procedure and experience an "unanticipated
outcome" as a result of surgical error, an error that was preventable
and one that causes you to suffer much more harm than the original
injury. The operating surgeon comes to your room, and in the
presence of your spouse, offers a full apology, including an offer of
restitution. What happens if that offer does not materialize or if the
settlement otherwise fails? The injured party is left in the intolerable
situation of having to file suit and prove precisely what the health-care
provider has already acknowledged.
This kind of scenario has been considered by scholars other than
Robbennolt, scholars who recognize that statutes like these may be
problematic for plaintiffs.28 After all, it would be "maddening" to be
forced to prove what the physician freely admitted.29 Yet, presumably
because of the potential for facilitating settlements, proponents of
these statutes hold that on balance "the plaintiff is better off."30 Of
course, this is the dilemma. The protected full apology often increases
the likelihood of settlement, yet, when settlement fails, the result is
horrific. Now the plaintiff suffers not only the primary physical injury
that gave rise to the claim but also suffers a secondary moral injury as
a result of being re-victimized by the protected apology.
More than efficacy should be considered before policymakers
abandon traditional rules of evidence, rules that allow the trier of fact
to consider expressions of fault on the issue of liability. Robbennolt
suggests more empirical research should be conducted. I agree. It
seems critical to evaluate the participants' understanding of the effect
of the evidentiary rule. Does a layperson know what it means to say
that an apology could not be used against the defendant in court? This
is an important question because in an experimental study like

27. Id.
28. E.g., Orenstein, supra note 24, at 255.
29. Id. Orenstein, a proponent of broad protections like that provided by the Colorado
statute, states that "though it might be maddening for a defendant . . . to deny in open court
what it admitted in an �pology, the plaintiff on balance is better off .
." Id.
.

30. Id.

.
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Robbennolt's, there may be a variety of factors that could contribute
to a lack of understanding by the participants of the evidentiary
implications of the protected apology. For example, some may lack
the time and the incentive to learn enough about the law to truly
understand its moral and legal implications. And for the participants
who did understand the implication of the evidentiary rule, did that
contribute negatively to their decision to settle? Would there be a
group within the population who would capitulate and settle rather
than prove what they already know?
We need also to reflect on whether we really intend to allow utility
to trump other factors when policy considerations are at issue.
Throughout her essay, Robbennolt was focused on those factors
that "worked" or were "effective" or "beneficial" in influencing the
claimant to settle. Efficacy is, of course, an important consideration
yet it should be only one of many policymakers weigh. Policymakers
should also consider how proposed rules distort a defendant's moral
compass or even subvert the very nature of apology and its place in
the dialectic between harm and reconciliation. The risk of subversion
arises whenever we transcribe moral processes into systems that are
primarily adversarial.
We live in a culture in which it is becoming increasingly difficult to
evaluate the integrity of apologies we witness.31 Often, apologies are
more akin to strategic communications than to expressions of heartfelt
contrition. The full apology is the exception. It acknowledges harm,
it expresses sorrow, it accepts responsibility for the harm caused and
the consequences that follow. Yet, when it is protected, its integrity
is placed in jeopardy. This is why policymakers must ask critical
questions as they deliberate on issues of apology, law, settlement, and
morality.32
Is the telos of statutes like that in Colorado - the granting of
impunity to full apology - what we want to teach our children? Do
we want to encourage full apologies that are protected from
consequences? Does protecting the full apology reflect the morals of a
society that has relaxed its demands around issues of accountability or
have the lines become blurred because of the utilitarian objectives the
protection seeks to effect in a litigation context? That is, have we

31. As Miller observes, this is because of the ease with which remorse can be faked,
"how hard it is to distinguish genuine remorse that arises as a moral response to the harm
done . . . from equally genuine amoral regret that arises from the discomfort the whole fiasco
is causing the wrongdoer. " MILLER, supra note 14, at 94; see also supra note 14.
32. The questions of morality I raise have not been a part of the legislative debate. For
example, when California passed its statute protecting partial apologies, lawmakers focused
almost exclusively on utility. This was clear when its sponsor emphasized that apology is
"underrated and underused as a tool in legal settings," often overlooked as a settlement tool
or as a lubricant for settlement talks. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160, cmt. - Assembly
Committee on Judiciary,(West Supp. 2004).
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become a society that places more value on the settlement of lawsuits
than on accepting responsibility for the harms we have caused?
These are not merely theoretical questions. As Robbennolt notes,
six states have already enacted laws addressing apologies, and thirteen
more, including Michigan, have considered or are considering such
legislation.33 So far, the majority of the enacting states protect the
partial apology, but an essay like Robbennolt's could turn the tide
toward the protection of the full apology.
I offer this Reply not because I wish to stand in the way of findings
like those offered in Robbennolt's "Empirical Examination." Rather,
I write as one who still holds the view that when someone offers a full
apology they should do so with a willingness to accept the
consequences that flow from the harm they have caused. I do not insist
on apology. I recognize that it remains a moral option for one who has
caused harm, and that there may be circumstances when one chooses
not to risk apology or times when moral courage fails. Yet I believe
that if one truly seeks to express a full apology, one should offer it
without the protection a statute like that in Colorado provides. This is
because a full apology is much more than a litigation resource; it is the
voice of repentance.

33. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at 470 & nn.44-45.

